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The introduction of low-cost generic drugs upon patent expiry is an extremely 
contentious issue, with public health activists accusing pharmaceutical companies 
of profiteering at the expense of public health provisions, whereas pharmaceutical 
companies insist that stronger and lengthier protection for their intellectual 
property rights is necessary for them to sustain investments in research and 
development. This study is an overview of the transition from patent monopolies 
to free markets, studying the evolution of legislation and the mechanisms of 
introducing competition from generic pharmaceuticals once a patent expires.  
 
The TRIPS agreement, due to come into force in January 2005, has major 
implications for countries that have not yet introduced intellectual property 
legislation, as it will require them to introduce a minimum standard of patent and 
data protection legislation. This study looks at the possibilities available to such 
countries regarding the transition process, and the effects that different legislative 
measures could have on their economies. It also makes some recommendations 
regarding measures that will facilitate the fastest and cheapest possible 
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1.1 The Great Public Health Debate 
 
Patent protection for medicinal products has been the subject of much recent 
scrutiny in the media. Many claim that patents are responsible for elevating prices 
and thus restricting the availability of certain drugs used in treating preventable 
diseases, particularly in third world countries with limited healthcare funds.1 
Others, especially research-based pharmaceutical companies based in developed 
countries, insist that patent protection is essential for promoting continued 
innovation into new, more effective medicines.2 The AIDS crisis is a particular 
issue bringing this debate to the attention of the public. 
 
Whatever the arguments in this ongoing debate are, one thing is certain. The 
World Trade Organisation’s (“WTO”) controversial TRIPS3 agreement is due to 
come into effect in 2005, ensuring that the majority of countries that have not 
already done so will be forced to introduce a minimum standard of intellectual 
property protection into their legislation, including certain elements of patent and 
test data protection. Many say that this will adversely affect public health 
provisions in developing countries, as it will allegedly restrict the production and 
availability of cheap generic drugs that these countries rely on to control disease. 
Although the compulsory licensing measures reaffirmed under the Doha 
Declaration of 20014 ensure that essential drugs can be made available at low cost, 
the successful use of such measures, especially in Brazil,5 has been met with 
antipathy from certain developed countries, and there have been concerns that 
such opposition will discourage the use of this measure in the future, effectively 
undermining its intended purpose. Bilateral trade agreements between developed 
                                                 
1 KAMAL-SMITH, M., et al., 2002. Generic competition, price and access to medicines. Oxfam 
Briefing Papers, July 2002. 
2 CRESPI, R. S., 2003. IPRs under siege: first impressions of the Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights. European Intellectual Property Review, 25 (6), 242-247 
3 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Annex 1C of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements completed in 1994. Full official text available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
4 A full explanation of the Doha Declaration is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm 
5 BBC News (2001) Brazil to break AIDS patent.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1505163.stm 
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and developing countries have also been held responsible strengthening 
developing countries’ patent regulations beyond that required under TRIPS, in 
some cases limiting the effectiveness of the WTO’s compulsory licensing 
measures under Doha.6 
 
High drug prices are not only a problem in the developing world. In countries 
where medicines are funded by the state through healthcare bodies such as the 
UK’s National Health Service and Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 
high drug prices can significantly impact healthcare budgets,7 and thus these 
governments will aim to keep prices as low as possible while continuing to 
promote innovation.  
 
1.2 Pharmaceutical Patenting and Regulation 
 
Research based pharmaceutical companies invest billions of pounds annually in 
developing new drugs and improvements to existing treatments.8 Discoveries that 
have the potential to be developed into products are patented wherever possible. A 
basic patent will award the patentee an effective monopoly term of a minimum of 
20 years. However, in the case of pharmaceuticals, most of this term is usually 
spent conducting tests and clinical trials to determine the drug’s effectiveness and 
safety, and to convince regulatory authorities that the drug is fit for large-scale use 
on human patients. According to Cunningham, approximately 90% of drugs that 
enter clinical trials are not successful, and are either abandoned or researched 
further, modified and resubmitted for testing. Pharmaceutical companies therefore 
rely on the few drugs that are successful as their main source of income, using the 
profits to recover the large sums of money invested in research. Due to the limited 
amount of time available between marketing authorisation9 and patent expiry, 
profits must be kept high if the company is to recoup its investments in such a 
                                                 
6 PALMEDO, M. and MAYNE, R., (2002). US Bullying on Drug Patents: One Year After Doha. 
Oxfam Briefing Papers, November 2002. 
7 DRAHOS, P., et al. The FTA and the PBS: A submission to the Senate Select Committee on the 
US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Available at: 
http://evatt.labor.net.au/publications/papers/126.html 
8 CUNNINGHAM, R., 1998. Running with the Regulators. Managing Intellectual Property, 82, 
16-31. (“Cunningham”) 
9 Marketing authorisation is when the relevant regulatory body approves the drug for full-scale use 
on human patients.  
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short space of time. Patents for successful drugs are extremely valuable and can 
constitute a significant part of a company’s asset portfolio. 
 
1.3 Generic Drugs and Price Competition  
 
A generic drug is effectively a “copy” of an existing drug that is introduced by a 
third party “generics firm” after the originator’s patent expires. As generics firms 
have much lower R&D expenses, they do not need to recuperate the same level of 
investment, and can therefore afford to sell their products at much lower cost, 
which the originator will not be able to match. Generic drugs have been the basis 
of low cost treatment for several years, and large-scale buyers of pharmaceuticals, 
including state healthcare authorities, will naturally favour the cheapest product. 
Originators have repeatedly claimed that their products are safer and more 
effective than generic equivalents, although there is yet no evidence to prove these 
claims, a fact that has been publicly confirmed by an official of the US Food and 
Drug Administration.10  
 
The mechanisms of introducing generic drugs once a patent expires has been a 
much-debated issue in recent years, especially in Europe, which has recently seen 
two major changes in legislation and two high profile cases in the European Court 
of Justice.  
 
The speed at which generic drugs are introduced to the market largely depends on 
legislation concerning patents and also the protection of test data submitted to 
regulatory authorities as part of the procedure for obtaining marketing 
authorisation.11 This data is often the result of expensive and lengthy tests, 
requiring trials on both animals and humans. The exclusivity of this data would 
result in generics manufacturers having to repeat trials at considerable expense, 
presenting a considerable barrier to entry and significantly delaying the 
introduction of generic competition, allowing the originator to maintain its 
monopoly well beyond patent expiry. However, originators, usually large, 
                                                 
10 From a speech by Dr. Mary Fanning, associate director for medical affairs in the office of 
compliance at the FDA’s centre for drug evaluation and research, in 1998. Cited in Cunningham.  
11 COOK, T., 1998, Maximising Chemicals Protection in Europe. Managing Intellectual Property, 
76, 39-44. 
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research-focused multinationals, insist that the expenses incurred in producing 
these data must be recuperated, and therefore tend to favour strong data 
exclusivity measures. 
Measures have evolved that allow rapid generic introduction following patent 
expiry whilst still providing adequate compensation to originators for losses 
incurred due to the regulatory process. These measures have become increasingly 
complex, and will be discussed in detail later in this study. 
 
TRIPS, although fairly explicit in its requirements for patent protection, allows 
considerable flexibility for countries that are yet to introduce legislation protecting 
regulatory data. Although this flexibility allows countries to develop their own 
approach to this issue, it also presents a dilemma for countries yet to implement 
such legislation, as the models used in developed countries are subject to constant 
review and amendment, and even then may not be the most suitable option. 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse legislation in the developed world and its 
effect on company and market behaviour in respect of patent expiry and generic 
introduction, and suggest possibilities for legislative measures that would promote 
the best interests of developing countries yet to introduce such measures. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
 
This study is divided into two parts, the first being an analysis of European and 
US Law in respect of measures relevant to the transition between patent 
monopolies and free markets. These measures are patents, data exclusivity and 
regulatory procedures. The first two are forms of intellectual property, with data 
exclusivity being a sui generis form of protection within regulatory law. 
Regulatory procedures are important as they largely determine the barriers to 
market entry for manufacturers of generic drugs. This study includes a 
retrospective analysis of European law, also including key measures implemented 
in the US, which influenced the European decision making process. Also included 
is a comparative study of European and US law, highlighting some of the key 
differences, and some of the problems faced. Particular focus is paid to loopholes 
in US law, and some of the strategies firms use to exploit these. 
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The second part relates to the implementation of Article 39.3 of TRIPS, which 
specifies the requirements for the protection of test data as required under 
international law. The terms of the agreement are analysed, together with a brief 
study of market conditions in India. This enables the findings from the first part to 
be related to the terms of TRIPS and market conditions in an economically 
significant developing country to formulate recommendations that will promote 
public health and economic growth in the domestic pharmaceutical sector of such 
a country. 
 
Part 1 – Legislative Review 
 
The research for this study was mainly centred on the analysis of EC Directives 
and European case law, thus taking a positivistic approach, extracting and 
analysing the relevant facts from the law. The effects of case law and public 
criticism in the development of legislation were also taken into account. 
 
Articles and case comments relating to the subject were also analysed. As these 
were mainly subjective, this research took an interpretivist approach. These 
articles were used to help interpret the Law, in addition to studying its 
implications for the relevant parties involved. Articles available on the Internet 
were also used in determining foreign developments, particularly in relation to 
US. 
 
EC Directives and case law were located by searching legal databases, notably 
WestLaw and Lexis-Nexis. Articles were also located by searching these 
databases, and by searching the online archives of well-known Intellectual 
Property journals. Articles and case comments, especially those relating to US 
Law, have been located by searching the websites of major IP law practices, 
which often provide legal updates and comments, and through regular internet 
search engines such as Google. Unlike major law publications, which are usually 
written by corporate lawyers and therefore favour the research-based sector, 
Internet websites are popular among activists who strongly support the generics 
lobby and are against strong intellectual property provisions, especially in the 
developing world. Using articles from various authors favouring both innovatory 
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and generics firms was beneficial in developing a balanced and objective 
understanding of this contentious debate. 
 
There are some limitations to the methodology employed. Only a selection of 
high-profile US Case Law was used, although this adequately highlighted key 
features of US Law. US statutory law was studied using articles and reports to 
Congress, which provided detailed explanations of the concepts and provided 
useful case studies.  
Certain UK and European journals were not accessible, which led to a limitation 
of the number of articles used in this study. 
Studies relating to the behaviour of firms were conducted qualitatively through 
studying articles and news bulletins, and although this provided a general 
overview of the tactics used, an exhaustive quantitative study of firms’ behaviour 
was not carried out. 
 
Part 2 – Analysis of possibilities available under TRIPS Article 39.3 
 
As the wording of Article 39.3 is fairly ambiguous in its requirements, significant 
references were made to articles on this subject to provide possible interpretations 
for the terms under the Article, which was subsequently broken up into four 
distinct criteria for protection. 
As the resulting recommendations are intended to promote both public health and 
economic development within developing countries’ pharmaceutical sectors, it 
was decided that India was to be used as an example of a developing country. This 
was because India is an economically significant country with high profile public 
health problems, but also has a successful pharmaceutical industry. Assessing 
factors that contributed to this success was useful in predicting some of the 
requirements of generics industries in the developing world. Market conditions 
were assessed using articles from journals, news websites and online magazines, 
as well as from personal experience. 
After studying the Indian market and the needs of its pharmaceutical industry, it 
was possible to relate some of the concepts studied in the first section of this study 
to a developing market such as India within the context of TRIPS. 
Recommendations were made by modifying selected concepts to suit the needs of 
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the Indian economy. The flexibilities offered by TRIPS, and the effects of 
different interpretations of Article 39.3 on certain practices were also studied. 
The main limitations of this section of the study is that recommendations are made 
based on purely qualitative studies of firm and market behaviour, and that 
recommendations are often untested variations of existing practices. These 
recommendations are also based on unofficial interpretations of Article 39.3, due 
to the lack of case law clarifying the terms under the agreement. 
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2. Introduction to the Process of Drug Approval 
 
The process of getting a drug from the laboratory to the market is a long, 
expensive and complex one, and often forms a significant part of companies’ 
R&D and marketing budgets.12 There are various procedures for different types of 
new developments. For example, the process of approving a new chemical entity 
will be much longer and exhaustive than that for a new formulation or a generic 
equivalent of an existing treatment. 
 
In Europe, among other jurisdictions, the different procedures are divided into 
three main categories: 
 
New Drug Applications (“NDA”) largely concern the regulation of new chemical 
entities (“NCE”), which are newly discovered chemicals that may have desirable 
therapeutic characteristics. NDAs require the applicant to conduct and provide the 
results of lengthy tests and clinical trials. The tests are required by Article 8(3)(i) 
of EC Directive 2001/83 to include physico-chemical, biological or 
microbiological tests, and pre-clinical (toxicological and pharmacological) tests. 
These tests are usually carried out on animals, and have been subject to criticism 
from activists against the practice. 
Compounds that are successful in pre-clinical testing are then approved for 
clinical trials, and are known as Investigational New Drugs (IND). Clinical trials 
are carried out on human subjects, and are divided into four stages, each stage 
requiring more time and volunteers.13 Phase I trials are carried out on healthy 
volunteers unaffected by any medical conditions, in order to prove the safety of 
the drug and to determine any possible side effects. After it has been determined 
that there are no detrimental side effects in the short-term (usually around a few 
months), Phase II trials can begin. These are designed to test the clinical 
effectiveness of the treatment, and are carried out on affected patients over around 
2 years. If these are completed satisfactorily, Phase III trials are carried out. This 
                                                 
12 PhRMA (the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) estimates the process to 
cost on average US$500 million over 15 years before a newly discovered chemical entity can be 
marketed as a medicinal product, although this will vary considerably according to individual 
circumstances. From Cunningham.  
13 http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/genome/tacklingdisease/hg12b006.html 
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is similar to Phase II but with a far higher number of trial subjects (sometimes 
thousands). This takes a long time, but allows the applicant to provide adequate 
and conclusive proof demonstrating the treatment’s safety and effectiveness. As 
Phases II and III are carried out over several years, any possible mid- term side 
effects that may emerge would be seen in Phase I subjects. Mid to long-term side 
effects that are not immediately visible during initial testing can be disastrous to a 
company’s reputation, as Chemie Grünenthal discovered in the 1950s when its 
antiemetic drug Thalidomide was found to cause birth defects when used on 
pregnant women. This was at a time when testing on humans was minimal, and 
current procedures have been designed to ensure that drugs are proven to meet 
stringent safety requirements before they reach the market. Modern clinical trials 
do not stop with a grant of marketing authorisation. Phase IV trials involve 
receiving and analysing feedback from medical practitioners, which allows the 
manufacturer and the authorities to continually monitor the treatment’s 
performance, and to react quickly to any signs of previously undetected side 
effects. 
 
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) are applications to market generic 
equivalents of existing treatments. Such applications rely on the originator’s test 
data and do not require the resubmission of data, but require that the originator’s 
data is not protected and that the applicant can prove that the generic meets certain 
criteria such as bioequivalency to the original product. These criteria have been 
the subject of two cases in the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and a recent 
change in legislation, and will be discussed in detail later. The purpose of 
abbreviated applications is to save generic producers from having to repeat 
clinical studies, thus lowering entry barriers for potential competition following 
patent expiry. ANDA provisions are crucial in preventing the needless repetition 
of tests, which is desirable on both economic and ethical grounds, as such tests 
cost millions of dollars and involve lethal animal testing as well as human trials. 
 
Hybrid Abridged Applications are used when an applicant uses data previously 
submitted to the authorities (as with an ANDA) together with new data as part of 
an application. This is common for applicants who are applying for authorizations 
for new indications or other improvements to an existing treatment. New 
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indications include different dosage schedules and methods of administration. 
Significant alterations to an existing drug’s chemistry are usually not eligible for 
hybrid applications, and will need to use the NDA procedure. Such an example is 
Thalidomid, a single optical isomer of thalidomide, rather than a racemic mixture 
as used in the controversial original drug. The new version, produced by US firm 
Celgene, is to be used in the treatment of leprosy, which is considerably different 
to the original use of thalidomide.14 
 
2.1 Patent Protection and Regulatory Data Exclusivity 
 
Patents and data exclusivity are both commonly used to protect medicinal 
products, but the mechanisms of protection are considerably different. 
 
Patents are effectively temporary monopolies granted in a particular jurisdiction in 
exchange for disclosing full details of an invention that is “novel, contains an 
inventive step, and is industrially applicable”.15 Patents are normally valid for a 
period of up to 20 years, on the condition that periodic renewal fees are paid. As 
long as a patent is in force, the patentee has the right to exclude any third party 
from making, using, disposing (ie: selling), offering, importing or keeping the 
patented product without prior authorisation. Patents are not limited to end 
products, as processes can also be patented, preventing use by third parties. Such 
patents would also indirectly cover any direct products of a process. 
A patentee effectively has exclusive rights to his invention throughout the life of 
the patent. In addition, the rights to a patent can be licensed, traded or sold. Patent 
protection is the strongest form of protection available for pharmaceutical 
products. However, the costs of protection are high, and the criteria for 
patentability are strict, and considerable numbers of patent applications fail as a 
result. 
 
The protection of test data does not confer the same nature of protection as a 
patent, but the criteria for eligibility are also considerably different. In most 
                                                 
14 Doctor’s Guide, 1996. Thalidomide Submitted for NDAs for Use In Leprosy and AIDS 
Cachexia. http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/daa6.htm 
15 Article 52(1) European Patent Convention 
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developed countries, any data that is produced by an originator and submitted in 
relation to a successful NDA shall be protected for a limited period (ten years in 
the EC). Data exclusivity, afforded through a sui generis provision within 
regulatory law, is automatic and does not require payment of renewal fees. As the 
criteria for protection are much lower than that for patentability, this measure 
effectively provides an additional layer of legal protection for innovative 
pharmaceutical companies, as if they fail to patent a successful drug, they can still 
obtain limited protection through the exclusivity of submitted test data, thus 
temporarily discouraging competition and reducing risk for innovatory companies, 
which is desirable on policy grounds as it encourages investment in R&D. It also 
provides a degree of protection if a patent should be subsequently invalidated for 
any reason, particularly as a result of litigation.16 
 
Data exclusivity is especially important for firms that formulate medicinal 
products using unpatentable substances such as naturally occurring products, as 
this is often their only form of intellectual property protection preventing the entry 
of competition.  
 
 It is important to note that data protection does not confer a monopoly right, but 
prevents potential competitors using the originator’s data as part of their own 
abbreviated applications. This means that a competitor can legally generate and 
submit its own test data as part of the procedure to obtain marketing authorisation 
for a competing product, which, if successful, can be launched in direct 
competition in the absence of any patent protection. Although data protection 
provides a barrier to entry, a competitor can still legitimately enter the market in 
the absence of patent protection if it thinks it can recoup its investment in 
reproducing the data, which is rare in reality, but in the case of the lucrative 
pharmaceutical market is always a possibility. Therefore, although data protection 
does offer limited protection for products that do not meet the criteria for 
patentability, it should not be relied upon as an outright substitute for stronger 
patent protection. 
                                                 
16 PUGATSCH, M.P., 2004. Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the 
context of innovation and market access. ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy options 
for Affordable Access to Essential Medicines, Bellagio, Italy. Available from:  
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf 
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Test data, like patents, can also effectively be “licensed”, by giving consent to a 
third party to use the data (e.g.: for an ANDA or hybrid application) before the 
expiry threshold, possibly in exchange for a fee or another form of consideration. 
 
The patent system and the regulatory process are not entirely independent. Due to 
the fact that a large portion of the life of drug patents is lost due to the length of 
tests, many countries have introduced measures to compensate patentees for this 
loss by extending patents beyond the 20-year limit. The original idea was 
originally conceived in the US, and is now present in the legislation of many 
developed countries. US legislation contains a provision that grants a Patent Term 
Extension (PTE), the length of which is related to the time that the drug spent in 
the clinical testing and regulatory process. Most PTE provisions offer a maximum 
extension period of five years from the end of the basic patent. 
 
In certain countries, data protection is also affected by the concept of patent 
linkages, which means that a data exclusivity period need not extend beyond the 
life of the corresponding patent. This meant that if a drug patent expired, its test 
data would no longer be protected. There have been many complaints about this, 
especially from pharmaceutical firms and the lawyers that represented them.17 
 
                                                 
17 CAMPOLINI, M., 2003. Protection of Innovative Medicinal Products and Registration of 
generic Products in the European Union: Is the Borderline Shifting? European Intellectual 
Property Review, 2003, 25(2), 91-97 (“Campolini”) 
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3. The Evolution of Regulatory Provisions and the Patent Monopoly/Free 
Market Transition in the Pharmaceutical Sector. 
 
Until the 1960s, regulatory requirements were extremely lax by today’s standards, 
and there were considerable procedural differences throughout Europe. Animal 
testing was the norm for testing drug safety, and human trials were used only 
sparingly. 
In the early 1960s, the Thalidomide disaster sparked an outcry, as it was found 
that the methodologies used in testing were inadequate, and that small-scale 
human trials could have detected the side effects and prevented the disaster, which 
affected over 15000 foetuses.18 
 
3.1 The First Step Forward 
 
In 1965, the council of the European Economic Community (EEC) passed a 
harmonising directive, 65/65/EEC19, which considerably harmonised drug 
regulation procedures throughout EEC countries. Most importantly, it stipulated 
the information required by the relevant authorities before a drug could be 
approved for marketing.20 These data requirements were designed to allow 
national regulatory authorities to effectively assess whether a drug was safe and 
effective in its intended use.  
 
A notable feature of the legislation was Article 4(8)(a), which contained certain 
exceptions where data could be replaced by references to previous tests for 
products that already had an “established use”. This provided a considerable 
advantage to generics firms, as they were simply required to prove that the 
originator’s product was “established”, and to provide references to the 
originator’s data in order to gain approval for a competing product. It was argued 
that these exceptions put innovatory firms at a significant disadvantage, as there 
were no provisions for the protection of data submitted to authorities, and that 
                                                 
18 LINGHAM, A. (2000) Thalidomide. Available at: 
http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/thalidomide/start.html 
19 Council Directive of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products. 
20 Namely physico-chemical, biological or microbiological tests, pharmacological and 
toxicological tests, and clinical trials, as stated in Article 4(8). 
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drugs that did not obtain patent protection were vulnerable to copying. Also, 
owners of drug patents that only obtained marketing authorisation late in the 
patent’s life had a very short time to recover their investment in development and 
testing before generic competition could enter the market. 
 
In order to reduce differences in national regulatory systems caused by varying 
interpretations of Article 4(8), detailed requirements for testing procedures and the 
resulting data were laid out by EEC Directive 75/318.21  
 
3.2 Roche v. Bolar and the Hatch Waxman Act 
 
In the early 1980s, a US patent infringement case took place that would ultimately 
bring about one of the most important pieces of legislation in the modern 
transitional process. The US had a system much more in favour of innovatory 
forms over generics, and generics producers had to repeat certain tests to obtain 
marketing approval from the FDA. In this case, Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. began 
conducting tests for a generic version of flurazepam hydrochloride. Flurazepam 
was covered by a patent licensed to Roche Products Inc. Roche brought a patent 
infringement action against Bolar.  
US patent law contained an exception for de minimis use, which covered 
experimental use. A US District Court rejected Roche’s claim on the grounds that 
Bolar’s infringement of the patent in conducting the tests was covered under the 
de minimis exception. The CAFC22 later reversed this decision after an appeal.23 
 
Although this decision was not entirely unexpected, it gave momentum to a 
campaign to introduce groundbreaking legislation that promised “cheaper drugs 
today, better drugs tomorrow”, promoting the interests of both the innovatory and 
generic pharmaceutical industries. This legislation was introduced in 1984 as the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,24 now more commonly 
                                                 
21 Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of Member 
States relating to analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect 
of the testing of proprietary medicinal products. 
22 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
23 Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 04/23/1984) 
24 P.L. 98-417 
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known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.25 It acted on the outcome of Roche v. Bolar by 
specifically stating that conducting tests and trials as part of the FDA regulatory 
process was covered under the de minimis exception, therefore allowing generics 
producers to conduct required tests before the expiry of the originator’s patent. 
This concept is now widely known as a “Bolar” or “springboarding” exception. 
Bolar exceptions also led to the creation of an abbreviated procedure for generic 
drug applications, whereby such applications could rely on existing test data, 
providing they can meet the criteria for eligibility. This lowered entry barriers 
considerably, and encouraged generic competition upon patent expiry. Such 
ANDA procedures are now used worldwide.  
 
The Act also made concessions in favour of innovatory firms by introducing 
Patent Term Extensions. This allowed the extension of patents based on the 
amount of time the drug spent in the FDA regulatory process. This extension 
would give a drug a maximum patent coverage of 14 years following marketing 
authorisation, but any extension could be no longer than 5 years.26  
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also introduced the concept of providing NDA applicants 
with a period of market exclusivity following marketing authorisation. This meant 
that the FDA would not consider any application for a generic competitor for five 
years following authorisation. This was an alternative protection measure for 
medicinal products that were not protected by patents, as the manufacturer would 
still have an opportunity to recover R&D expenses. Modern data exclusivity 
measures are derived from this concept, although there are variations in the scope 
of protection. 
 
Finally, the Act introduced the “Orange Book” concept. This requires NDA 
applicants to state the patents that it believes will be infringed if a generic 
competitor is introduced during the life of the patents. The patents relevant to each 
approved pharmaceutical are then listed in a publicly available register. 
 
                                                 
25 Named after Henry Waxman and Orrin Hatch, the US Senators who originally advocated the act. 
26 SCHACHT, W. and THOMAS, J., 2002. Pharmaceutical Patent Term Extensions: A Brief 
Explanation. CRS Report for Congress, Penny Hill Press. 
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Springboarding and Patent Term Extensions have now been adopted by many 
developing countries around the world, but the Orange Book concept has not been 
as widely accepted. 
 
3.3 Data Exclusivity in Europe 
 
Following much discontent from the innovatory pharmaceutical industry 
regarding the lack of protection for test data, and the resultant potential for “free-
riding” by generic competitors, the EC issued Directive 87/21 in 1987.27 This was 
a major overhaul of 65/65, and introduced several new concepts to the regulatory 
process. The most significant was the addition of a period of exclusivity for test 
data, whereby a generic competitor could not apply for an ANDA within this 
period. The period for protection was 6 years for non-high technology products, 
and 10 years for high technology products, including most biotechnology 
products. Unlike the US, which offered a period of complete market exclusivity 
for originators, generic applications would still be considered within the data 
exclusivity period if the applicant could supply their own data. 
 
87/21 also stated that an ANDA can be made for a product that is “essentially 
similar” to a reference product of which the test data is no longer protected. The 
“essential similarity” threshold is not defined further, which led to much 
confusion regarding the conditions for eligibility for the ANDA procedure.  
 
Another concern with 87/21 was the patent linkage option within Article 8(a)(iii) 
for non-high technology products. This allowed member states the option of 
introducing legislation that only protects data until the relevant patent expires. 
Innovatory firms had hoped for data protection beyond patent expiry to allow 
them a greater period of market exclusivity, allowing them to recoup the costs 
associated with the regulatory process. The implementation of patent linkages 
ultimately rested in the hands of national governments, who were effectively 
given the choice of favouring either innovatory or generic firms. According to 
                                                 
27 Council Directive 87/21/EEC of 22 December 1986 amending Directive 65/65/EEC on the 
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to 
proprietary medicinal products 
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Campolini, patent linkages were not readily accepted by original member states, 
but accession states in Eastern Europe readily implemented the concept into their 
legislation.  
 
3.4 Europe follows Hatch-Waxman. 
 
The EC decided in 1992 to introduce Patent Term Extensions into its legislation.28 
The extension term under the regulation was favourable for innovators, and could 
last up to a maximum of five years.29 As it was fairly rare for drugs to be approved 
within the first ten years of patent life, maximum extension terms were potentially 
frequent. US extension terms are calculated differently, equal to the period the 
drug spends in the FDA approval process, plus half the time spent in testing. The 
European term was subject to a maximum patent monopoly period of 15 years 
following marketing authorization. 
 
Although Europe had chosen to adopt PTEs, it had still not introduced Bolar 
exceptions, thus strongly favouring innovatory companies. Although 
“experimental use” is not an act of patent infringement under the legislation of EC 
member states, certain states such as the UK did not see testing for regulatory 
purposes as experimental use.30 Generics producers based in these countries were 
in a much weaker position than their North American counterparts, and often led 
to these firms carrying out tests abroad in order to avoid patent infringement.  
 
3.5 Community Regulation – One Step Closer to a Single Pharmaceutical 
Market 
 
A major problem in the European Community was the variation in regulatory 
processes and patent laws, which led to inconsistencies between member states, 
and made applying for authorisation across Europe difficult. In 1993, the EC 
                                                 
28 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products 
29 Under Article 13 of the directive, the SPC extension term is equal to “the period which elapsed 
between the date on which the application for a basic patent was lodged and the date of the first 
authorization to place the product on the market in the Community reduced by a period of five 
years” 
30 Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co [1984] FSR 574.  
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decided to set up an agency that would be responsible for Community-wide 
regulatory approval.31 This agency, the London-based EMEA, would be key in 
harmonising regulatory policy across Europe. All high technology products that 
would obtain 10 years of data exclusivity under Directive 87/21 must go through 
the EMEA. 
Another policy reason for establishing the EMEA was to discourage firms from 
preventing parallel importing within the Community, which was a major hurdle to 
overcome if the Community was to behave as a single market. To encourage 
pharmaceutical firms to treat the Community as a single market, it was a condition 
of approval by the EMEA that the drug had to be marketed under a single trade 
mark throughout Europe. Although this disadvantaged firms by encouraging 
parallel importing, the benefits to firms of using a single regulatory procedure 
outweighed this single disadvantage. The only exception to the single trade mark 
rule was when a member state objected to a trade mark after it was submitted. An 
example is Hoechst Marion Roussel’s trade mark Refludan, which was rejected by 
the Spanish trade mark registry. The firm was allowed by the EMEA to use a 
similar name, Refludin, in Spain. This is the only exception to the single trade 
mark rule to date.  
 
The option of using either the centralised route or separate national routes to 
approval has allowed for a certain degree of flexibility in Europe. In addition, 
competition between the EMEA and national agencies has led to the two making 
their best efforts to meet the needs of applicants and to offer a good service. Two 
anonymous studies comparing the FDA and the EMEA32 found that 78% of FDA 
applicants felt that they had been held up by the FDA, whereas 94% of EMEA 
applicants were either satisfied or very satisfied with the standard of service. 
Miller subsequently states in his study that the EMEA is “(more) effective and 
cheaper” than the FDA. 
 
                                                 
31 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for 
the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and 
establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
32 Quoted in Cunningham as being cited in a comparative study by Henry Miller, Stanford 
University. 
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3.6 The Meaning of “essentially similar” 
 
This was one of the questions asked by the English Court of Appeal to the ECJ in 
R. v Medicines Control Agency ex. p. Generics (UK) Ltd.33 The ECJ was also 
asked to determine whether new indications should be protected independently for 
a period of 6 or 10 years from the date of filing of a hybrid application, or whether 
they should be protected only as long as the reference NDA. The ECJ decision34 
delivered a blow to the innovatory sector by ruling that new indications would 
only be protected until the exclusivity period covering the reference data expires. 
For example; if an innovatory firm obtained approval from the EMEA for a new 
dosage schedule for a drug 7 years after the original marketing authorisation, that 
new schedule would only be protected for the remaining 3 years of the exclusivity 
period. Any subsequent ANDA would cover the new indication as well as the 
original NDA. 
 
The ECJ also provided three tests for essential similarity. A product must have 
“the same qualitative and quantitative composition in terms of active principles, 
the same pharmaceutical form and is bioequivalent, unless it is apparent in the 
light of scientific knowledge that it differs significantly from the original product 
as regards safety of efficacy”. These have since become the accepted requirements 
for eligibility for the ANDA procedure. 
 
3.7 Do Bolar Exceptions violate TRIPS? 
 
Across the Atlantic, Bolar exceptions as originally conceived under the Hatch-
Waxman act had become a welcome and established feature of US and Canadian 
law. Canada, with its booming generic drug industry, had also introduced 
legislation allowing stockpiling of generic drug supplies before the expiry of the 
originator’s patent. Europe, the world’s greatest opponent of Bolar exceptions, 
believed that stockpiling before patent expiry put originators at a disadvantage, 
and was in violation of European and International Laws. The EU issued a 
                                                 
33 [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 201 
34 [1998] E.C.R. I-7967 
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complaint against Canada to the WTO,35 alleging that stockpiling a generic during 
patent life, and Bolar exceptions themselves, were in violation of TRIPS. Article 
30 of TRIPS allows exceptions to patent rights providing that they do not 
“unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner”. The WTO 
decided that the use of a patented chemical for testing purposes to satisfy 
regulatory requirements for marketing after patent expiry was covered by Article 
30, but stockpiling was detrimental to the interests of the patent holder and 
therefore in violation of TRIPS. Although the EU had managed to prevent pre-
emptive stockpiling, the decision was a relief to the US, as the WTO had 
sanctioned the legitimacy of Bolar exceptions. 
 
3.8 The Current State of Play 
 
Directive 65/65 was replaced in 2001 by a codifying directive, 2001/83. This was 
only cosmetically different from the amended 65/65, and did not address any of 
the issues raised following the outcome of Generics UK, especially those relating 
to the protection of new indications. 
In 2004, the ECJ handed down a decision based on questions asked by the English 
Court of Appeal in R. v. The Licensing Authority ex. p. Novartis Pharmaceuticals 
UK Limited.36 One of the questions asked explicitly if a new indication (B) that 
was approved as part of the hybrid procedure under 2001/83 Article 10 (formerly 
65/65 Article 4), referring to the original product (A), whether that indication 
would be covered by an ANDA for a generic product (C) that referred to the 
original NDA for (A). The decision followed that in Generics, saying that 
indications approved under a hybrid procedure would only be protected as long as 
the original product, and that the ANDA for (C) would cover and include the use 
of indication (B). Although this was not a great surprise, there were arguments in 
the press that the existing framework did not provide any incentive to improve a 
                                                 
35 EU v. Canada. WTO Decision WT/DS114/R 
36 [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 26 
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treatment once it has been approved.37 This prevented further research that could 
further improve the safety and efficacy of a drug after it was approved. 
 
Shortly after the decision in Novartis, the European Council produced Directive 
2004/27. This was the most radical overhaul of the existing legislation since data 
protection was introduced in 1987. 
The most prominent feature of this directive is the new Article 10(6), which is the 
first time a Bolar exception has explicitly been introduced into European 
legislation. This is likely to have been influenced by the success of this provision 
in the US and the outcome of EU v Canada, where the legitimacy of Bolar 
exceptions had been confirmed. The European decision meant that all of the major 
developed powers with major pharmaceutical industries had introduced the 
legislation. Australia had already adopted the rule, and the Japanese Supreme 
Court had ruled that disallowing Bolar exceptions was contrary to the principles of 
its patent system.38  
 
The introduction of Bolar exceptions resolved the confusion caused by varying 
definitions of “experimental use”. The UK did not recognise testing as 
experimental use, whereas Germany allowed testing as an exception from patent 
infringement.39 The UK, however, did not require the submission of samples as 
part of an ANDA application, whereas other countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands required sample submission, which is regarded as an act of patent 
infringement.40 Sample submission is now permitted as an exception to patent 
infringement under Art. 10(6) of the amended Directive 2001/83. 
 
Another feature that many welcomed was the scrapping of the “essential 
similarity” threshold. This was in turn replaced with the term “Generic of a 
reference medicinal product”. However, the given definition of a “generic 
medicinal product” in Art 10(2)(b) is almost identical to the definition of essential 
similarity as handed down by the ECJ in Generics UK. This means that although 
                                                 
37 COOK, T., 2003. Regulatory Data Protection if Medicinal Products in Europe. Bio-Science Law 
Review. Unknown. (“Cook”) 
38 Ono Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. V. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 1998. Case No. Heisei 10 (Ju) 
153. 
39 Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II. (Bundesgerichthof Case X ZR 68/94) 
40 Generics BV v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd [1997] R.P.C. 801 ECJ 
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the term has been changed, the threshold for being classed as a generic remains 
essentially the same. The reasoning behind this change was to recognise new 
indications, as they have previously fallen under the ambit of “essential similarity” 
and therefore had not been eligible for additional protection. 
 
Other measures include a uniform 10 year data protection term across Europe, 
instead of the variable 6 or 10 year term as before. This will undoubtedly simplify 
regulation procedures in Europe. As it is likely that the longer 10 year protection 
terms may frequently exceed patent life, patent linkages for regulatory data 
protection have also been removed. This means that any drug that fails to obtain a 
patent will still be eligible for data exclusivity under Art. 10. An exception to the 
10 year protection period is that a potential competitor may submit an ANDA after 
8 years, although the ANDA will not be approved until the 10 year protection has 
elapsed.  
 
A significant move that has been welcomed by innovatory firms is the recognition 
and protection of new indications. If a new indication is submitted in the first 8 
years of data exclusivity, the data exclusivity period for the original NDA, 
including the new indication, will be extended by one year, giving a total 
protection period of 11 years. Contrary to the US approach, new indications still 
do not receive separate protection from their original treatments. The one-year 
extension is not cumulative, and protection will last for no longer than 11 years. 
Some have responded saying that this is a step forward, but still does not go far 
enough.41 This provision is commonly known as the 8+2+1 rule. 
 
Since the original beginnings in 1965, the transition between patent periods and 
free markets for drugs has become increasingly complex, but regulation and 
legislation has become increasingly transparent, with clarification from both legal 
studies and case law. Many of the qualms of the industries involved have been 
addressed in the recent amendments, but in this fiercely competitive sector, there 
will always be conflict, and managers and lawyers on both sides will need new 
and innovative ways to find ways to further their interests.  
                                                 
41 CAMPOLINI, M., 2004. Fixing the Safety Net. Patent World, 2004, 162, 25-29 
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4. A Comparative Scrutiny of EC and US Legislation 
 
The evolution of US and EC law regarding data exclusivity and generic 
introduction shares many similarities, but is decidedly different in many areas. 
Both have their own advantages and disadvantages. This section is a comparative 
study between the two, detailing some of the differences, and some of the 
problems still faced in the two jurisdictions. 
 
After the recent changes in European legislation, basic ANDA procedures in the 
US and EC bear many similarities. The criteria for being eligible for the ANDA 
procedure are very similar in both jurisdictions. The EC criterion of “generic of a 
reference medicinal product” is defined in Art. 10(2)(b) of directive 2001/83 as 
amended,42 and the equivalent US definition, now defined under the Section 21 
Part 314.94 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, states that the subject of 
an ANDA must be “the same as a listed drug”.43 It must be noted that 
bioequivalency is implied in the US definition, and the FDA requires proof of 
bioequivalency as part of any ANDA.  
Both the US and EC now provide springboarding exceptions for bioavailability 
testing and experimentation required to prove bioequivalency. This means that 
such tests may be legitimately conducted before the expiry of a patent. This 
provision is new in the EC, and it is likely that the EC will consider extensive case 
law from the US in disputes relating to this provision.  
 






                                                 
42 “generic medicinal product” shall mean a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and 
quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference 
medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been 
demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies. 
43 According to the FDAC, “the term “same as” means identical in active ingredient(s), dosage 
form, strength, route of administration, and conditions of use.” A listed drug is a reference drug 
that is approved under the NDA procedure. 
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4.1 Data Protection Terms 
 
The EC now offers data exclusivity terms of ten years. This protects data 
submitted as part of NDAs by ensuring that the data is not used in the approval of 
an ANDA during the exclusivity period. This, however, does not prevent generic 
applicants obtaining and submitting their own data. The EC also allows generic 
applicants to submit an ANDA after eight of the ten years have elapsed, although 
the ANDA will not be approved until the exclusivity period has expired. The US 
provision adopts a different approach. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a drug that 
obtains marketing authorisation from the FDA is granted five years market 
exclusivity. As this exclusivity protects the product, rather than the submitted 
data, no generic applications will be accepted by the FDA during the five-year 
period, even if the applicant produces data independently. As the FDA takes an 
average of around 20 months to approve an ANDA following submission,44 the 
effective exclusivity obtained in the US is usually over 6 years.  
 
The US approach is a more favourable option for generics manufacturers, as these 
firms will usually wait for exclusivity to expire rather than reproducing test data, 
due to the expense and effort in doing so.45 Therefore, the fact that the US offers 
complete market exclusivity is of little impact. The most important factor is that 
producers would rather wait for 5 years than 8 before being able to submit an 
ANDA. Innovatory firms, knowing that generics producers will not reproduce test 
data, will naturally favour the European approach.  
 
The US also offers an extended 7-year exclusivity period for orphan drugs,46 to 
encourage research into treatments for rare diseases. These drugs do not usually 
make large profits, and therefore innovators may decide not to patent them, due to 
the expenses involved. An extended market exclusivity term will provide low-cost 
but effective protection, and provides an incentive for research in what are usually 
seen as high-risk, low-profit activities. Research into rare diseases also provides 
an indirect advantage for specialist clinics based in the US, which will be helped 
                                                 
44 www.ranbaxy.com/inv_2004/investors_meet_2004.ppt 
45 Interview with Marie-Therese Rainey, legal advisor in regulatory affairs and pharmacovigilance 
to the EMEA. Managing Intellectual Property, 82, 24-27 
46 Drugs used to treat 200000 people or less. 
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by the benefits of added research into such conditions, and any new treatments 
that may emerge as a result. 
 
4.2 Protection of new indications 
 
This is another field where EC and US legislation differ considerably. The EC 
only recently introduced legislation protecting new indications. This protection 
involves the extension of the data protection term for the original reference 
product by one year. The protection term for the new indication will be covered 
under the extended term for the reference product. The data protection term for the 
new indication will expire along with that for the reference NDA, and any 
subsequent ANDA will cover any new indications that are based on the relevant 
reference product.  
This procedure is significantly different to that in the US, where each new 
indication receives an additional three years protection, independent of the 
original reference product. 
 
The advantage with the US approach is that unlike the EC approach, it provides an 
incentive for continued research and improvement of existing treatments, as each 
new indication will be awarded its own period of exclusivity. The EC offers an 
incentive for the first new indication, but no additional incentive for subsequent 
improvements, as the one-year extensions are not cumulative. Although this 
approach does provide an incentive for post-approval research, there will be no 
incentive for continued research after the first new indication is approved. 
 
The US approach also has its problems. As each new indication is protected for 
three years, the innovator can start a chain of improvements, known as a “Follow-
on Product Strategy”.47 This involves staggering applications for new indications, 
with each subsequent indication obtaining its own exclusivity period. This will 
leave generic competitors marketing products using outdated indications, while 
the originator’s version will use the latest indication. This will continue until the 
                                                 
47 CZABAN, J and LESKOVSEK, N., 2003. Beyond the Patent Term: Regulatory Exclusivities In 
The U.S. Pharmaceutical Market - Crucial Issues and Strategies. Available at: 
http://www.hewm.com/use/articles/BeyondthePatentTerm.pdf 
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innovator ceases to seek approval for new indications. Although this does not stop 
generic competition, the originator’s product, which is usually branded, may be 
seen as more effective, and thus will not be as widely replaced with generic 
substitutes, allowing the originator to retain a large portion of the market share, 
thus raising costs for end consumers. It also promotes the commonly 
misconceived notion that generic drugs are less effective than those produced by 
the originator, a message the generics industry is keen to avoid. The problems 
caused by such a strategy are often intensified by the use of advertising.  
 
This system of approval for new indications has led to generics firms using “carve 
out” strategies,48 which involve omitting information on the packaging and 
labelling that could infringe the exclusivity offered to a protected indication. This 
is subject to the requirement that the safety of the drug is not compromised. 
Innovatory firms that obtain protection for new indications often respond with a 
strategy known as “discontinued labelling”, whereby labels are continually revised 
to prevent the safe and legitimate use of “carve out” strategies. 
 
The EC and the US have taken to rather extreme measures in respect of new 
indications. Some argue that European protection is inadequate,49 while others 
believe the US system offers excessive protection for new indications. Many have 
accused the EC of favouring generics producers when it comes to new indications, 
especially following the outcomes of Generics UK and Novartis.50 The new 
European one-year extensions are certainly a concession to these critics, but they 
have certainly not been appeased, and some are still pursuing stronger protection 
for new indications. 
 
4.3 Marketing, Branding and TV Advertising 
 
Innovatory firms are known to use monopoly periods wisely, not only to ensure 
maximum profits during patent life, but also to develop brands for their products. 
These brands act as an assurance of quality, and firms will use these brands to 
                                                 
48 Ibid 
49 CAMPOLINI, M., 2004. “Fixing the Safety Net” Patent World, 2004, 162, 25-29 
50 JONES, N., and NITTENBERG, R., 1999. “Essentially Similar” despite being Different – the 
Squibb Case. European Intellectual Property Review. 21(4), 217-219. 
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retain as much of their market share as possible upon patent expiry. The 
advertising of branded prescription drugs is an interesting phenomenon that can 
have significant consequences for the industry. Most countries, including Canada 
and the members of the EC, have outlawed direct-to-consumer television 
advertising for prescription-only medicines. The main concern associated with 
such advertising is that it gives patients the impression that branded drugs are 
more effective than their generic counterparts. In countries with managed, state-
funded healthcare such as the UK and Australia, patients are always subscribed 
generic drugs wherever possible. Allowing patients to be exposed to 
advertisements for drugs may lead to conflicts between doctors and patients, and 
may lead to unnecessary additional expenses for health services. However, in the 
US, healthcare is largely private, and advertising pharmaceuticals is common 
practice. This often leads to consumers demanding branded medicines at premium 
prices, and allowing innovatory firms to retain a significant share of the market 
after patent expiry. Coupled with the procedures for the protection of new 
indications in the US, this can make it difficult for generics producers to allay 
rumours of inferior performance, and thus make it more difficult for them to 
obtain a sizeable share of the market upon patent expiry. The advertising of new 
indications for branded drugs has also been used to significantly reduce demand 
for older indications that are used by generics manufacturers. Such a tactic was 
used by Eli-Lilly to encourage the use of a protected new indication of its popular 
antidepressant Prozac over generic substitutes of the original indication upon 
patent expiry.51  
 
Another problem caused by advertising is that companies will spend large 
amounts of money on marketing existing brands rather than invest in R&D to 
produce new ones. It has been suggested that research based pharmaceutical firms 
often spend more on marketing existing brands than they do on R&D.52 
 
The exception to the prohibition of television advertising in Europe and many 
other countries is with openly available “over-the-counter” drugs, where 
                                                 
51 WIRZ, M., 2003. Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years? Oklahoma Journal of Law & 
Technology, Unknown. 
52 GLASGOW, L., 2001. Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights:  Has the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far? IDEA, 227, 235-36 
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advertising is common practice, and where branded drugs often retain a sizeable 
portion of the market share after patent expiry. Advertising drugs in printed media 
is allowed in certain European countries, notably Germany and Switzerland. 
 
4.4 Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations - 
The “Orange Book” Rule. 
 
The “Orange Book” is a concept devised in the US, whereby NDA applicants are 
required to state the patents that they believe will be infringed by an ANDA that is 
approved before the patents expire. These patents are then quoted in a publication 
that states the patents that cover particular drugs. This is a useful measure for 
generic applicants that are considering ANDAs to determine which patents cover 
the drug in question and when they will expire. The “Orange Book” rule also 
benefits patent owners, as any applicant filing a Paragraph IV ANDA (see below) 
must notify the patent proprietor. ANDA applicants are also required to state their 
intentions with regard to each patent listed as relevant to the reference product. 
This saves patent owners the expense of employing “patent watching” services to 
notify them of potential infringements, and provides a minor entry barrier for 
generics firms. Some see the “Orange Book” rule as favouring originators and 
strengthening patent protection.53 However, it works in favour of both innovators 
and generics firms, helping the latter to plan ahead, providing information on 
patents and reducing the risk of unexpected patent infringements, and helping 
patent owners to detect infringements without relying on expensive watching 
services.  
 
4.5 Paragraph IV ANDA Applications in the US 
 
The US divides ANDAs into four main categories: 54 
(1) that patent information on the drug has not been filed;  
(2) that the patent has already expired;  
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(3) the date on which the patent will expire; or  
(4) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use or 
sale of the drug for which the ANDA is submitted.” 
 
The first two would mean that the ANDA would be authorised upon the expiry of 
any market exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman, and the third from the date of the 
expiry of either the patent or the exclusivity period, whichever is the later. 
The fourth is a form of ANDA not available in Europe, and largely made possible 
by the US Orange Book concept. It is effectively a contentious generic 
application, known as a Paragraph IV application, which is filed together with a 
claim that the originator’s “Orange book” patent(s) are invalid or not infringed by 
the generic. The first applicant to file a Paragraph IV ANDA is rewarded with 180 
days market exclusivity following authorisation. This effectively encourages 
generic applicants to challenge the validity of patents and the scope of patent 
claims. Patent owners naturally have the tendency to argue the validity and scope 
of their patents, and usually counterclaim for patent infringement. In such cases, 
the ANDA is suspended until the patent is declared invalid, up to a maximum 
suspension of 30 months. If a patent is found to be valid and infringed by the 
generic, the ANDA will not be approved until the patent expires. Following the 
outcome of Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, the 180-day exclusivity 
period will be awarded to the Para. IV applicant even if their defence against a 
patent infringement suit is unsuccessful, and the ANDA is not approved until after 
patent expiry. The existence of this procedure partly explains the relatively large 
volume of patent revocation suits in the US. The Paragraph IV procedure provides 
an avenue for generics manufacturers to find and attack weak patents, and gain 
quick access to markets using an integrated revocation and ANDA procedure, 
rather than waiting for patents to expire. It is estimated that in 2002, 70% of Para. 
IV ANDAs were successful,55 indicating that the procedure is of benefit to 
generics manufacturers. 
 
In Europe, no such procedure exists, which means that applicants who wish to 
invalidate a patent in order to release a generic onto the market will have to file 
                                                 
55 Navigant Consulting, 2004. Generic Pharmaceutical Litigation. Available from: 
http://www.navigantconsulting.com/lifesciences/SMR/genlit/genlitSP.pdf 
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invalidation proceedings and ANDAs separately. However, even if such a patent 
revocation action is successful, originators will often still be protected by the 
lengthy data exclusivity terms offered in Europe, which means that it is cheaper 
and less risky for generics firms to wait for patent expiry before launching a 
generic product, thus explaining the relatively low volume of revocation actions in 
Europe in comparison to the US. 
 
4.6 “Evergreen” Patents 
 
Under US law, any ANDA that becomes the subject of a patent infringement 
claim is given a stay of a maximum of 30 months under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
delaying the approval of that generic until the expiry of this period, or until a court 
decision acquits the generics firm from any wrongdoing. This procedure has 
become the victim of much abuse by pharmaceutical companies.56 
As market exclusivity for drugs is often worth millions of dollars a day, 
pharmaceutical companies have often used a strategy known as “evergreening” to 
extend their monopoly beyond patent expiry. This strategy involves issuing patent 
infringement proceedings against ANDA applicants just before a patent is due to 
expire. This triggers the automatic 30-month stay for the ANDAs, allowing the 
originator to effectively retain its monopoly for 30 months following patent 
expiry. This 30-month stay is often confused with PTEs under Hatch-Waxman, 
although they are separate, unrelated procedures. This strategy has been the cause 
of several frivolous patent infringement claims, which are designed solely to 
trigger the 30-month stay and have no legal basis. 
Companies that market products covered by several patents have often triggered 
progressive delays for ANDAs by filing multiple, staggered infringement 
proceedings based on different patents. The US Government has since closed this 
loophole by only allowing one delay per product.57 
The legislative loophole that allowed evergreening has drawn much criticism to 
the Hatch-Waxman act, and is often seen as the major failing of an otherwise 
extremely successful and popular bill. It has also been proposed that legislation be 
                                                 
56 JOSEFSON, D., 2002 US Senate considers proposal to tighten drug patent law, British Medical 
Journal, 324, 1176. 
57 BBC News, 2002. US Plans boost for generic drugs. Available From: 
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amended to eliminate the automatic 30 month stay, and that any delays in ANDA 
proceedings should be determined by a court on a case-by-case basis.58  
Europe does not automatically delay ANDAs when proceedings are issued against 
the applicant, therefore this issue is not encountered. 
 
4.7 Exclusivity Periods for Generics 
 
Under certain circumstances, the first generics firm to enter the market will be 
awarded a 180-day exclusivity period. This is notably the case for Para. IV 
applicants. Although this allows a generic competitor to gain an advantage by 
seizing a significant portion of the market share before others enter the market, it 
has also been used to the advantage of innovatory firms. These firms have been 
known to pay generics firms not to market their products during the 180 day 
period, effectively giving the originator another half a year of market 
exclusivity.59 This has since been changed such that if the first ANDA applicant 
does not market their product within 75 days of approval,60 the 180-day 
exclusivity period will be nullified. However, due to the high value of market 
exclusivity, originators still have an incentive to carry on this practice, as even 70 
days of exclusivity can be worth millions of dollars. 
Europe has managed to avoid controversy in this area as it does not offer any 
exclusivity period to generic applicants, thus often resulting in several generic 
competitors entering the market at the same time, making it difficult for 
originators to reach deals preventing competition. 
 
4.8 Europe’s Single Trade Mark Rule 
 
A major economic advantage the US has over Europe is that it is a single market. 
Europe, in a move to encourage the Community to behave as a single market, 
requires any applications for Community marketing authorisations through the 
EMEA to specify a single trade mark that the drug will be marketed under. This 
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encourages the free movement of goods throughout the community. This means 
that, for example, the UK’s NHS will be able to source a drug from Poland if 
prices are lower. This makes it difficult for manufacturers to fix prices in 
individual countries. From a marketing point of view, using a single trade mark 
across Europe is easier, as brands will be recognised by people from across the 
continent. It is also a step towards global branding, as a single European brand is 
likely to bear similarities to its counterparts in the US and other major markets. 
However, despite its numerous advantages, the compulsory requirement for a 
single trade-mark has come under criticism for being an unnecessary complication 
that reduces flexibility and disadvantages firms.61 
 
4.9 Second Medicinal Uses – Swiss-Type Claims 
 
Second medicinal use claims,62 involve formulating patent claims to protect the 
use of a drug in treating a condition other than that it was originally designed for. 
Such claims usually take the form of "The use of (substance X) in the manufacture 
of a medicament for the therapeutic and/or prophylactic treatment of (medical 
condition Y)".63 Such claims require some evidence, and although detailed clinical 
studies are not required, purely speculative claims will not be accepted.64 A UK 
court decided in American Home Products Corp. v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK 
Ltd.65 that derivatives of the patented product(s) would not be covered by second 
medicinal use claims, as it could not be proven that all derivatives would be 
effective for the claimed purpose, and therefore any claim relating to derivatives 
did not provide sufficient information for a skilled person to determine which 
derivatives would work and to formulate an effective treatment.  
Swiss-type claims do not protect new indications, as this involved detailing new 
information regarding the first medicinal use, rather than a new medicinal use that 
is different from the originally intended purpose.66 
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Some countries have been more willing to accept such claims than others. The US 
has been keen to accept these claims, but European countries, notably the UK, 




5. Data Exclusivity and TRIPS 
 
The protection of test data is covered under Article 39.3 of TRIPS. This does not 
provide detailed information as to what is required of data protection measures, 
allowing considerable flexibility for countries that are yet to introduce legislation. 
The minimum standard of data protection required by TRIPS is much weaker than 
that available under US or European legislation mentioned earlier. There are 
certain criteria, however, that need to be met. 
 
Firstly, only data that is required as part of an application is required to be 
protected. Therefore, the protection of supporting data that is surplus to the 
requirements of the application procedure need not be protected. Any protection 
afforded to such supporting data will be supplementary to the requirements of 
TRIPS. Such “TRIPS-plus” measures have often been criticised by certain 
development organisations as such measures offer stronger intellectual property 
protection than required by international law, advantaging innovatory firms over 
generics manufacturers. 
 
Secondly, only data submitted regarding the approval of a new chemical entity is 
covered under Art. 39.3. This means that new indications of existing treatments do 
not need to be covered. New uses of existing treatments are also excluded from 
Art. 39.3. The definition of “new chemical entity” is again open to interpretation. 
If incorporated into legislation, the scope of the definition will have a major 
impact on the ambit of protection offered under that legislation. 
 
Thirdly, protection shall only be awarded when the data produced are the result of 
“considerable effort”. This is in line with the argument that data protection is a 
reward for effort rather than innovation.67 Legislation in the developed world has 
tended towards protecting all data submitted as part of NDAs, without the need to 
prove “considerable effort”. It will again be the decision of individual countries to 
decide whether this test is necessary. 
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 Finally, data must be protected from “unfair commercial use”. The ambit of this 
term is again subject to manipulation, depending on the definition of the 
individual terms. The “unfairness” test is particularly flexible, but one that could 
lead to legal action from developed countries if the standard of protection is 
deemed inadequate. There is no relevant case law that defines “unfair” in this 
context, although Correa provides some clarification by studying the law of unfair 
competition in the context of the Paris Convention. 
 
One of the flexibilities afforded to countries is the option to protect data through 
either confidentiality, or through a sui generis system of exclusivity provision as 
used in most developed countries.  
 




6. Differences between Markets and Industries in Developed and Developing 
Countries. 
 
Intellectual property legislation is relatively new to most developing countries, 
and recommendations for legislative measures cannot be based on the successes 
and failings of IP measures in developed countries alone. The nature of markets 
and practices in developing countries must be taken into account. 
 
India is a good example of a developing country with a flourishing pharmaceutical 
industry, but which still faces major problems in overcoming poverty and disease. 
India currently has one of the largest generics industries in the world. Of the 
$27bn worldwide generics market in 2001, Indian firms accounted for around 
$7bn. By 2007, the market will have a projected value of $57bn, with Indian firms 
projected to account for over a third.68 India has the capacity to produce drugs for 
a large number of LDCs without such production capacities. Legislation in India 
will therefore have an indirect effect on the supply of generic drugs throughout the 
developing world. So far, India has resisted pressure from the developed world to 
introduce strong intellectual property measures in excess of those required under 
TRIPS. However, its decisions will be of significant importance to its public 
health measures and to the development of the global generics market. 
 
Currently, the most important issue for India is increasing the availability of 
effective, affordable drugs to deal the country’s mounting public health problems. 
As there is little state healthcare available, most people, many of whom live below 
the poverty line, are forced to pay for their own treatments. As such, the Indian 
market requires large quantities of low cost drugs to treat disease, many of which 
are unique to the region, together with globally problematic diseases such as 
malaria and AIDS.  
 
Unfortunately, the bulk of pharmaceutical research carried out by multinationals is 
directed at problems faced in the developed world, as successful treatments can 
obtain patent protection and investment can be recovered. The same does not 
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apply to developing countries. Research into diseases commonly encountered in 
these countries is considerable, but many multinationals are reluctant to engage in 
such research, as successful products are often copied by local generics firms due 
to the lack of effective patent legislation.69 Countries such as India will either need 
to provide adequate protection for these multinationals to recover their 
investments, or rely on its own industries to develop treatments. 
 
India is one of the more fortunate developing countries with regards to medicines, 
as its home-grown generic pharmaceuticals industry has expanded rapidly in 
recent years, with firms such as Dr. Reddy’s, Cipla and Ranbaxy now having a 
global presence. These firms are now large enough to invest in R&D and develop 
their own drugs.70 This provides a useful resource in dealing with local health 
problems. Other smaller firms, until recently, have still focused on 
retrosynthesising drugs and producing their own generic variants through different 
processes, which was legal in India until transitional legislation was introduced, 
allowing product patents.  
Legislation should take into account the needs of local firms. One of the 
objectives of TRIPS was to allow developing countries to foster their own 
innovative industries. As seen in India, successful local generics firms have 
developed into multinationals that are increasingly focusing on innovation. Such 
growth and development should be encouraged to reduce dependence on drugs 
originating from firms based in developed countries, and as such legislation 
should not stifle the activities of smaller generics firms, allowing them to grow 
and eventually develop their own research capacity. 
 
Patent legislation covering products for 20 years will be introduced in India in 
January 2005. This will inevitably result in foreign and local firms filing patents 
on their products, which will restrict the production of generic versions of 
patented products. According to Barraclough, it is expected that patent legislation 
will not significantly exceed the requirements of TRIPS. 
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The goals of any TRIPS compliant patent and data protection legislation in India 
will include ensuring the best possible levels of availability of cheap drugs to treat 
the most common local diseases. Legislation should also provide adequate 
protection to the R&D investments of local firms such as Ranbaxy by providing 
adequate intellectual property protection, without stifling generic drug production 
that local firms thrive on.  
 
The transition from patent monopolies to free markets will have a significant 
influence on the generics industry, as any delays or entry barriers following patent 
expiry will discourage generics firms from entering the market. Legislation should 
therefore allow the introduction of generic competition as quickly and cheaply as 
possible following patent expiry. In addition, it should encourage the entry of 
multiple generic competitors. A Canadian study71 has shown that the price of 
generic substitutes falls steadily with the number of competitors, until around five 
competitors are in the market. Therefore, legislation that encourages multiple 
competitors to enter the market will be more effective at lowering prices. 
 
An important provision available to India and other developing countries is the 
use of compulsory licensing. Any additional protection measures, especially data 
exclusivity, should ensure that it does not interfere with compulsory licensing 
measures, as this will limit the effectiveness of such a measure in dealing with 
public health emergencies. 
 
Another characteristic of the Indian medicines market is the heavy presence of 
herbal medicines. These will not be protected by patents, and therefore any 
protection afforded to them will be through data protection. In deciding whether to 
protect these, policymakers must consider whether any protection afforded to 
herbal medicines will benefit public health and local industry. 
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Black market medicine is a growing problem in India and other developing 
countries.72 Such medicine is often the result of high drug prices, forcing poorer 
patients to take a chance with illegally produced copies. These are usually 
produced by organised criminals and are often unsafe. A problem caused by 
TRIPS is that smaller generics firms that have previously been able to sidestep 
patent legislation may be forced out of legitimate business, and some may resort 
to producing drugs illegally, causing a boom in the black market. Legislation must 
ensure that these companies are given a chance to stay in legitimate business. 
A large proportion of drugs that will be patented and submitted for approval in 
India will not have been developed in India, nor have been developed specifically 
for the Indian market.73 Therefore, patent and marketing authorisation applications 
will often be based on those submitted in developed countries. Procedures will 
need to take this into account if they are to ensure maximum efficiency in 
processing applications. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that regulatory bodies will not have access to the 
same degree of funding as their counterparts in developed countries. Therefore, it 
must be taken into account that applications will usually take longer to process, 
and allowances must be made for this, as long delays could hold up generic entry 
and give unfair advantages to patent holders. 
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7. Recommendations for Developing Countries in Respect of the Transition 
from Patent Protection to Free Markets. 
 
Following detailed study of the concepts considered in the development of 
legislation in the developed world, together with a knowledge of market 
conditions in developing countries, it is possible to recommend legislative 
concepts that would work in favour of developing economies. Such concepts must 
be within the boundaries of the TRIPS agreement, the wording and interpretation 
of which will be very important in selecting and modifying concepts to be used. 
 
The suggestions made in this section are designed primarily for countries that 
already have the capacity to produce pharmaceuticals, and focus largely on 
enacting legislation that will encourage the growth and development of local 
industries, usually focusing on generics, rather than providing strong TRIPS-plus 
protection to encourage foreign investment. The reason for this is that local public 
health provisions rely on generic drugs, and to encourage foreign investment at the 
expense of generics and public health measures would be ethically questionable. 
In addition, one of the reasons for TRIPS, as mentioned earlier, was to enable 
countries to develop their own innovative industries. Indian firms have shown that 
successful generics businesses can grow into multinational companies with a 
considerable research capacity. Thus, these recommendations will focus on 
encouraging maximum generic competition upon the transition to a free market 
and encouraging the growth and development of local industries, whilst seeking to 
protect intellectual property rights as required under TRIPS. 
 
7.1 Regulatory Data Protection 
 
It is likely that developing countries will adopt some form of regulatory system, if 
they haven’t already done so. To refrain from adequately regulating drugs would 
compromise the safety of medical treatment available in the country, putting 
citizens at risk from inadequately tested, poorly formulated medicines. Such 
regulatory systems should ensure that all drugs authorised for use in a country are 
safe and effective for the intended purpose. As such, any data submitted as part of 
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applications for regulatory approval will need to be protected, as required under 
Art. 39.3 of TRIPS. 
 
An effective regulatory system will require data from exhaustive tests before a 
new drug is approved for use. There are two ways of protecting such data, either 
through confidentiality or offering a limited period of exclusivity. 
 
Providing confidentiality for test data is a simple provision that would prevent 
authorities from disclosing test data, meaning that it cannot be accessed by 
competitors. However, the measure does not protect the originator from ANDA 
applications that refer to the data. In the UK, the House of Lords decided in R. v 
Licensing Authority Ex p. Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd (No.1)74 that 
regulatory authorities were permitted to refer to confidential data when approving 
generic competition. This was advantageous for generic competitors, as they could 
submit ANDAs for approval immediately after the originator is granted marketing 
authorisation. 
 
Although confidentiality could work in favour of generics, the enforcement of 
such a measure is extremely difficult due to the free movement of information. As 
data exclusivity is offered in most developed countries, manufacturers in these 
countries will tend to publish the data in journals, knowing that it cannot be used 
by a competitor. Confidentiality would therefore offer little protection to data in 
developing countries, as potential competitors could simply gain access to a 
foreign journal and obtain the data. This may have global repercussions, as 
manufacturers may become reluctant to publish data in developed countries, 
knowing that it can be copied in developing countries without exclusivity 
provisions. Publication of data is important, as it allows medical practitioners to 
better understand the functions and dynamics of the drug.75 Discouraging such 
publications could limit information available to doctors, which would be 
detrimental to public health in the country concerned as well as globally, and 
therefore confidentiality would not be a desirable measure in the context of 
improving public health. 
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 Exclusivity of data, although unpopular with many developing countries, is a more 
favourable option, as it is easier to enforce, and will not disadvantage public 
health by discouraging the publication of data. However, it must be carefully 
decided what should be protected, and the extent to which it should be protected, 
as excessive protection will adversely affect generic introduction.  
 
7.2 Definition of “New Chemical Entity”, and the Protection of Herbal 
Medicines. 
 
TRIPS only requires the protection of “new chemical entities”. Anything 
surpassing this requirement will be TRIPS-plus and at the discretion of the 
country concerned. In considering whether to restrict exclusivity to NCEs, an 
issue that countries will have to address is whether they wish to use regulatory 
data provisions as a “safety net” by providing protection for unpatentable 
inventions. Such protection would offer security to local research in case 
inventions cannot be patented. However, it will also allow foreign firms to seek 
data exclusivity for unpatentable inventions, thus delaying the introduction of 
generic variants of unpatented medicines. As the majority of local firms rely on 
being able to produce generics, it seems that protection should be restricted to 
NCEs as required under TRIPS, as additional protection will be contrary to public 
health requirements and the development needs of local industry. 
A problem with this is that it does not reduce risk for local companies with 
growing R&D capacities that are developing drugs to combat local health issues. 
However, incentives to carry out such research can easily be provided by other 
means, such as tax breaks, and therefore data exclusivity beyond NCEs is not 
strictly necessary in promoting innovation. If data exclusivity is restricted to 
NCEs, alternative incentives should be provided to prevent firms moving research 
facilities to countries with stronger protection measures. 
 
An important factor affecting the scope of protection afforded by data exclusivity 
will be the definition of “new chemical entity”. Two examples are as follows: 
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IUPAC76 defines “new chemical entity” as “a compound not previously described 
in the literature”. Another definition suggested by Correa interprets “new” as 
requiring a patent standard of novelty.  
 
Using the IUPAC definition will protect compounds “not previously described in 
the literature”. This notably does not cover “traditional knowledge”, which means 
that previously unresearched traditional herbal and naturally derived treatments 
will be eligible for protection if their safety and efficacy can be demonstrated. 
This will encourage firms to research, test and market such remedies, resulting in 
herbal remedies with scientifically proven therapeutic characteristics potentially 
being developed into pharmaceutical products. Traditional herbal medicines are 
commonly used in developing countries, and although some are effective, others 
are merely placebos. Such remedies are an important resource for developing 
countries, with the potential for worldwide marketing if they are researched and 
developed successfully. They are also the subject of traditional knowledge, and 
allowing pharmaceutical firms to exploit and profiteer from such knowledge 
would be inequitable.  
 
Offering exclusivity for such products will result in higher prices for the 
exclusivity period, which may result in many poorer people being deprived of 
traditional remedies they often rely on. In addition, it may encourage biopiracy,77 
with firms profiteering by seeking protection for successful traditional medicines.  
 
Thus, if naturally occurring substances are to be covered under the ambit of “new 
chemical entity”, data exclusivity regulations should ensure that effective natural 
substances can obtain data exclusivity without depriving people of traditionally 
produced variants of the remedy. Exclusivity should thus be restricted to the use 
of test data, without following US practice and offering complete market 
exclusivity. A “prior use” provision should allow the continued use and sale of 
safe, traditionally produced medicines without approval, whilst pharmaceutical 
grade indications of the active substance will require approval for marketing. In 
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addition, countries that choose to protect pharmaceuticals based on traditional 
remedies will need to adopt strict controls to control bioprospecting activities to 
prevent biopiracy and other forms of unethical exploitation of traditional 
knowledge.  
Correa’s suggestion for the definition of “new chemical entity” would define 
“new” as requiring a standard of novelty as required under patent legislation. This 
definition is conceptually similar to IUPAC’s, as “novel” by patent standards is 
defined as “not part of the prior art”. The main difference between this definition 
and the IUPAC definition is that “prior art” covers all previous public knowledge, 
regardless of whether it has been published. The notable exception that leads to is 
the lack of protection for natural compounds that have been used traditionally but 
never documented, as traditional knowledge will form part of the prior art. 
Traditional medicines are ineligible from patent protection in many countries for 
the same reason. Incorporating the novelty standard into data exclusivity 
provisions would mean that certain unpatentable products and drugs based on 
traditional remedies that obtain approval would not receive data exclusivity, and 
will immediately be vulnerable to the granting of ANDAs for generic competitors 
shortly after approval. Although this lack of protection would discourage 
biopiracy, it would stifle any research into traditional medicines, which countries 
that are rich in biological resources may view as an important channel towards 
developing unique, locally sourced and produced products that can be sold 
internationally. 
 
Another advantage to generics manufacturers of the requirement of novelty for 
NCEs is in patent litigation. If a patent is invalidated on grounds of novelty, then 
by definition that compound is also not a new chemical entity, and therefore any 
data exclusivity protecting it can lawfully be revoked, allowing the invalidator to 
bring out a generic immediately upon such an invalidation, rather than having to 
wait for the data exclusivity to expire. 
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An important consideration indicated by Correa when defining “new chemical 
entity” is whether “new” is to be considered in a universal or local context.78 
Defining it in a local context will allow protection for substances that are new in 
the country concerned, even if they have already been in established use outside 
that country. This is not desirable, as it will allow firms to stall in making a drug 
available in a country, and thus delaying the availability of an important drug, any 
eventual generic competition. 
 
Defining “new” in a universal context will mean that applications for a new drug 
will have to be submitted before a drug is launched, as once it is launched in one 
country, it is no longer “new”, and thus not eligible for data protection in countries 
that have an NCE requirement for data exclusivity. This will encourage the 
synchronisation of approvals in developing countries with those in developed 
nations, as well as denying protection to old but previously unapproved drugs, 
allowing generic variants of such drugs to be produced if required.  
 
In summary, the definition of “new chemical entity” provides a degree of 
flexibility. In defining this term, countries will have to take into consideration 
whether they wish to offer protection for NDA data relating to traditional 
remedies, providing incentives to research and test such medicines and to develop 
effective products from them. Countries that allow exclusivity for drugs based on 
traditional remedies should ensure that such measures do not affect the traditional 
production of these medicines, and that adequate measures are in place to prevent 
biopiracy, possibly through the regulation of bioprospecting. As data exclusivity 
periods are generally much shorter than patents, using this measure to protect 
natural products will encourage research without resulting in lengthy monopolies. 
The “newness” of an NCE should also be defined universally, in order to prevent 
any undue stalling of applications for authorisation. 
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7.3 Mechanisms of Data Protection. 
 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS requires the prevention of “unfair commercial use” of test 
data. The definition of “unfair commercial use” is open to interpretation and 
provides considerable flexibility in the enactment of legislation. There is no 
official clarification regarding the exact meaning of the term, and little case law 
that details the possibilities available under this provision. A detailed dissection of 
the term is available in Correa. 
 
One of the goals of data protection legislation in developing countries is to ensure 
the swift introduction of an optimal level of generic competition upon expiry, 
resulting in the lowest possible prices. This is achieved by encouraging the 
introduction of multiple generic competitors. Legislation should therefore ensure 
that entry barriers for generics firms are as low as possible, thus encouraging them 
to enter the market due to the low associated costs.  
 
A successful means of doing this is by allowing ANDAs, therefore relieving 
generics firms of the burden of having to repeat expensive tests and trials, which is 
the most considerable entry barrier they could face in entering the market. ANDA 
provisions alone would be in violation of TRIPS, but providing a limited data 
exclusivity period before ANDAs are approved is seen as a legitimate solution, as 
it is common practice in most developed countries. This approach lowers entry 
barriers for generics whilst providing adequate protection for originators as 
required by TRIPS. The shortest exclusivity period is that of the US, which is five 
years. This is an adequate term for developing countries to follow, as any shorter 
terms may draw international criticism.  
 
In the US, the submission of ANDAs is not permitted during the exclusivity 
period, resulting in a longer effective exclusivity. If effective exclusivity is not to 
exceed the five-year protection period, a country will need to allow the submission 
of ANDAs during the exclusivity period, as practiced in Europe. This will rely on 
the presence of Bolar provisions that allow generics manufacturers to conduct the 
relevant bioavailability testing before patent expiry. Authorities will require 
enough time to approve the application. The FDA takes around 20 months, but 
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regulatory agencies in developing countries are unlikely to receive the same 
degree of funding, and so may take longer. As this is the case, ANDA applications 
should be permitted at any time following the original authorisation, providing 
they are not approved until the expiry of the exclusivity period and relevant 
patents. 
 
Under such provisions, if regulatory authorities can ensure that a marketing 
authorisation is made within the first 15 years of the corresponding patent’s life, a 
generic variant can be authorised using the ANDA procedure immediately upon 
patent expiry, thus resulting in the introduction of generics onto the market shortly 
after patent expiry.  
However, as NDAs can often be delayed, exclusivity periods may extend beyond 
patent expiry. The use of patent linkages in the EC has long been a solution to 
this, although it is no longer used, as it was decided that such a provision may be 
in violation of TRIPS.79 Although this would be a useful solution for developing 
countries to prevent originators’ monopolies extending beyond patent expiry, 
countries that decide to use this provision by default may face legal action from 
developed countries. The reasons given by Cook as to the illegality of such 
provisions is that automatic patent linkages would mean that products that are not 
covered by a patent will not be eligible for data protection at all, which is in 
violation of TRIPS, as this does not prevent “unfair commercial use” for data 
relating to unpatented products. A solution to this is to only allow patent linkages 
in cases where any delay in marketing authorisation is attributable to the applicant 
(e.g: through lack of due diligence), and that such linkages are not applicable to 
products that are not protected by patents. Linkages can also be applied to patents 
that are revoked, allowing rapid generic introduction following such cases. 
 
7.4 Summary Applications and the “Considerable Effort” Test 
 
Certain developing countries have already developed “summary application” 
procedures that permit drugs to be authorised on the basis that they are already 
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authorised abroad.80 This saves both regulatory agencies and applicants time. Such 
procedures are mainly used by foreign applicants looking to authorise their 
products in several countries. If a country decided to implement summary 
application procedures, the information required by such applications will have an 
indirect effect on generics procedures. 
 
As detailed in Barreda, Peru has a procedure which requires a simple proof of 
prior authorisation elsewhere. No data or other information is required. As such, 
the product is not protected in any way through such an application, as there is no 
data to protect, and therefore no protection is required under TRIPS. Therefore, if 
such a provision is present in legislation, any generic applicant will be eligible to 
apply for an ANDA immediately following a summary application, providing they 
can meet the criteria. In the absence of patent protection, the drug authorised 
through the summary procedure will be immediately vulnerable to generic 
competition. 
This brings the demand for such a procedure into question. Applicants may opt to 
use the standard NDA procedure and be afforded exclusivity for their data, rather 
than using a summary procedure. As the data will have already been produced, 
there will not be much additional effort required to use the NDA procedure. This, 
however, brings into question the “Considerable Effort” test stipulated under 
TRIPS. Under Art. 39.3, data must only be protected if it is the result of 
considerable effort. It does not specify whether “effort” includes financial 
expenditure. Nor does it specify whether that “effort” is meant in a general 
perspective, or specifically in relation to the application in question. This is 
noteworthy, as in a case where an applicant has already applied for an NDA 
abroad, it is arguable whether the data can be considered the result of 
“considerable effort” in subsequent applications, as that effort was made primarily 
in order to obtain authorisation elsewhere. One test that could be used is whether 
that data would have been produced if protection were not available in the country 
concerned. In the case of most developing countries, the answer would be 
negative, as data would have been produced regardless, in order to obtain 
authorisation in developed countries. Therefore, developing countries can enact a 
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provision based on the “considerable effort” test whereby data that would have 
been produced at any rate is not entitled to protection, which is a major concession 
to generics manufacturers.  
 
7.5 Data Protection and Compulsory Licensing 
 
Compulsory licensing is a measure that has been hailed as a lifeline for developing 
countries by many development organisations, as it allows the state to award a 
license to a generic manufacturer to produce a generic variant of a patented drug 
in the case of a public health emergency. This presents a danger to patent holders, 
as they risk having their patents undermined if such a procedure is used. In reality, 
such procedures are rarely used, due to the threat of recriminations from the 
international community, especially following the incidents regarding the 
compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs in South Africa and Brazil.81 However, the 
threat of compulsory licensing is usually sufficiently effective in encouraging 
patent holders to keep prices affordable to a large proportion of a population. 
Compulsory licensing measures are an effective means of keeping prices low and 
producing large quantities of cheap drugs when necessary. Data protection should 
therefore not interfere with such measures. Upon issuing a compulsory license, 
any data relating to the drug should be available to use by the state in producing 
the required drug, regardless of exclusivity. Continuing to enforce exclusivity 
during a compulsory license would undermine the effectiveness of the procedure. 
In addition, as compulsory licensing must be used by the state to treat public 
health emergencies, it is unlikely that the use of the data can be regarded as 
“commercial use”, and therefore such an exception would be legal under TRIPS.  
 
7.6 New Indications and Extensions of Data Exclusivity Periods. 
 
Data exclusivity periods can obtain extensions in certain circumstances in 
developed countries. Such extensions are afforded in the case of new indications 
in Europe, and in the case of orphan drugs in the US. As the main health concerns 
of developing countries will revolve around dealing with major diseases such as 
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AIDS and malaria, rare diseases will not usually be a high priority, and therefore 
extended protection for these will be unnecessary in most cases. 
The protection of new indications is not required by TRIPS, as these are not new 
chemical entities. However, continued research into authorised drugs is important, 
and although it is a TRIPS-plus measure, such a measure will offer distinct 
advantages to developing countries. Providing protection for new indications of a 
drug that are of “significant clinical benefit” to the local population could prove 
beneficial in encouraging firms to develop indications that are specific to local 
needs. As extended protection periods for new indications need not be long (1 
year in Europe), the long-term gains from having indications that are tailored to a 
country’s needs will outweigh the losses due to high prices in the short term. 
Therefore, a short extension of data exclusivity periods for new indications could 
have lasting benefits. The definition of “significant clinical benefit” will have to 
be considered carefully to ensure that any new indications are beneficial to public 
health, and that firms do not submit applications for indications of limited benefit 
solely to obtain extended protection. Extensions for new indications should not be 
cumulative, as this will disadvantage generics through the possibility of “follow-
on product” strategies as seen in the US.  
 
7.7 Eligibility for ANDA Procedures 
 
Legislation must make the criteria for eligibility for abbreviated approvals clear 
and transparent. It is obvious that any generic drug must be bioequivalent to the 
original. In addition, the drug should have the same active substance(s), and its 
pharmaceutical form should not adversely affect its efficacy in relation to the 
original. As such, the European definition of “essential similarity” is a useful test 
for developing countries to use. The definition of “essentially similar” in Generics 
UK and Novartis was criticised for favouring generics producers. As this would be 
advantageous to such industries in developing countries, such a term would be a 
useful addition to legislation. European case law provides detailed clarification of 
the term, which can be a useful reference for developing countries in considering 
the eligibility of ANDA applications. The European definition also allows a 
degree of flexibility for developing countries to formulate their own definition, 
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unlike the US definition, which states that a generic has to be “the same as a listed 
drug”. 
 
Europe also grants ANDA applicants authorisation to use any new indications 
within the ambit of “essential similarity”. This should also be allowed in 
developing countries, as it allows generics manufacturers to market the latest 
products, and eliminates any discrepancies between generic and originator drugs 
as experienced in the US. 
 
7.8 Patent Listings 
 
Patent listing systems, such as the “Orange Book” in the US, although regarded as 
TRIPS-plus, can provide many benefits to developing countries. It allows 
regulatory authorities and potential applicants to easily determine if an ANDA 
will infringe a patent before the application is submitted. This prevents firms 
inadvertently infringing patents and facing expensive litigation. 
 
This concept will also allow the enactment of a provision similar to Paragraph IV 
in the US allowing contentious ANDA applications. Such a provision will 
encourage local generics firms to challenge the validity of existing patents, and 
thus offer the chance of bringing generic variants onto the market before the 
relevant patent(s) are due to expire, which will lower prices and benefit public 
health.. Such a provision will also discourage the filing of weak or frivolous 
patents, as these will be vulnerable to invalidation proceedings. Providing 
temporary exclusivity as an incentive to generic applicants under such a procedure 
may be detrimental, as applicants may reach agreements with innovators that 
result in a delay in marketing the generic. Alternative incentives could include 
temporary exclusive selling rights to state healthcare initiatives, effectively 
awarding generic applicants a considerable share of the market upon entry, 
although this could adversely affect prices in the short term. 
 
Domestic generics firms that gain litigation experience by invalidating patents 
locally can use this experience to invalidate foreign patents and enter lucrative 
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markets in developed countries. Therefore, provisions along the lines of Paragraph 
IV will be beneficial to the development of generics firms as well as public health. 
 
It must be noted that Patent Listing systems can also create barriers to entry by 
requiring generics firms to state their intentions regarding the respective 
originator’s patents. Such provisions are not necessary for non-contentious 
ANDAs and will only discourage generic competition. Therefore, ANDA 
applicants should not be required to state their intentions unless they wish to 
contest the validity of a patent or seek a declaration of non-infringement. 
 
7.9 Bolar Exceptions 
 
It is recommended that following the outcome of EU v Canada in the WTO that 
countries should introduce Bolar exceptions into their legislation, as it legitimately 
affords generics manufacturers the right to begin testing a patented product before 
patent expiry.82 In addition, a Bolar provision would allow ANDA applications to 
be submitted before the expiry of patents and data exclusivity, which will allow 
authorities enough time to evaluate the ANDA, increasing the chances of approval 
immediately or shortly after the expiry of the relevant patents, allowing the 
generic to enter the market as soon as possible. Stockpiling, however, is not 
permitted, and therefore mass production of a generic will generally not begin 
until the relevant patents expire. 
 
7.10 Patent Term Extensions 
 
Patent term extensions are common in developed countries, and offer a 
considerable economic advantage to innovatory firms. These extensions are 
designed to compensate firms for the time and expense lost during the regulatory 
process. As these are not necessary under TRIPS, it is not recommended that 
developing countries enact such provisions, as this will delay the entry of generic 
drugs onto the market. An advantage this offers to firms in developing countries is 
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that patent monopolies will end in the country concerned before they end in most 
developed countries with PTE provisions. This means that such generics firms can 
stockpile drugs for export to developed countries, which gives them a significant 
advantage on a global scale. This is one of the reasons that Indian firms have been 
successful in the global generics market, and continuing to take advantage of such 
provisions will allow generics industries in developing countries to expand into 
foreign markets, and eventually evolve and develop research capacity. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The above suggestions are a few possibilities among the many available to 
developing countries in the formation of their legislation. The wording of Article 
39.3 allows countries considerable flexibility, which countries will have to take 
advantage of if they want to achieve their goals of improving public health and 
economic development.  
 
The evolution of legislation in developed countries is a useful reference in 
predicting the effects of certain legislative measures. Analysing the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of legislative measures in the two major developed 
jurisdictions, Europe and the US, helps to determine the effects of varying certain 
provisions. In addition, the long established provisions in the competitive US 
market provide a good indication of the potential loopholes that can occur, and 
how firms will exploit them.  
 
The prevention of the unethical exploitation of biological resources by 
corporations is an issue of increasing importance. If countries are to allow 
bioprospecting and the exploitation of biological resources, they must ensure that 
this is done equitably and without adversely affecting the local ecology. The ambit 
of data exclusivity measures can contribute to the incentives for firms to engage in 
such activities, and countries will have to take this into account when formulating 
policies regarding such matters. 
 
Although many have criticised measures in developed countries as being too 
strong for developing countries to use, certain measures such as ANDA 
procedures and Bolar exceptions have proved beneficial to generics in the 
developed world, and developing countries should not ignore them. The benefits 
of such measures will significantly outweigh the limited provision of data 
exclusivity, which is required in order to ensure the compliance of any ANDA 
provisions with TRIPS.  
Also patent listing, which is often seen as a TRIPS-plus measure, can easily be 
tailored to remove the associated entry barriers while still providing the benefits of 
increased transparency regarding originators’ patents, together with the possibility 
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for contentious ANDA procedures which will encourage generics manufacturers 
to challenge patents. 
 
Developing countries will have to use concepts from developed countries 
alongside their own measures, such as summary applications and compulsory 
licensing, to produce an economic environment that is beneficial to public health 
and generics manufacturers. Such manufacturers are important for producing 
generic drugs locally and fostering independence from foreign multinationals. In 
addition, promoting the interests of generics companies will allow the native 
pharmaceutical industry to grow, eventually penetrating the markets of developed 
countries and providing useful research channels that will be important for 





1) American Home Products Corp. v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd. 
[2001] RPC 159 
 
2) ATTARAN, A. and GILLESPIE-WHITE, L., 2001. Do Patents for 
Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa? 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 286, 1886-1892 
 
3) BARRACLOUGH, E., 2004. Industry fears drugs law reversal. 
Managing Intellectual Property, 141, 17-20 
 
4) BARREDA, J., 2003. Protection of Data in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector. Patent World Magazine, 158, 50. 
 
5) BARTON, J et al. (2003). Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy. (3rd Ed.). Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights. Available from: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm 
 
6) BBC News (2001). Brazil to break AIDS patent. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1505163.stm  
 
7) BBC News (2002). US Plans boost for generic drugs. Available 
From: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2348185.stm  
 
8) BBC World Service. Black Market Medicines. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/1718_pills/page4.shtml 
 
9) BINNS, R. and DRISCOLL, B., 1999. Are the generic companies 
winning the battle? Managing Intellectual Property, 89, 36-39 
 
10) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
[2001] RPC 1 
 56
11) CAMPOLINI, M., 2003. Protection of Innovative Medicinal Products 
and Registration of generic Products in the European Union: Is the 
Borderline Shifting? European Intellectual Property Review, 2003, 
25(2), 91-97 
 
12) CAMPOLINI, M., 2004. Fixing the Safety Net. Patent World, 2004, 
162, 25-29 
 
13) Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2001. Victory in South Africa, 
but the Struggle Continues. Available at: 
  http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/updateSA.htm 
 
14) COOK, T., 1998, Maximising Chemicals Protection in Europe. 
Managing Intellectual Property, 76, 39-44. 
 
15) COOK, T., 2003. Regulatory Data Protection if Medicinal Products in 
Europe. Bio-Science Law Review. Unknown. 
 
16) Correa, C.M., 2000. Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent 
Legislation in Developing Countries [online]. Geneva, The South 
Centre. Available from: 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/publichealth/toc.htm 
 
17) Correa, C.M., 2002. Protection of Data Submitted for the 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals:  Implementing the Standards of the 
Trips Agreement [online]. Geneva, The South Centre. Available from: 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/protection/protection.pdf 
 
18) Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the 
approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 




19) Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation 
of the laws of Member States relating to analytical, pharmaco-
toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the 
testing of proprietary medicinal products. 
 
20) Council Directive 87/21/EEC of 22 December 1986 amending 
Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary 
medicinal products 
 
21) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning 
the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal 
products. 
 
22) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of 
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
 
23) CRESPI, R. S., 2003. IPRs under siege: first impressions of the 
Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. European 
Intellectual Property Review, 25 (6), 242-247 
 
24) CUNNINGHAM, R., 1998. Running with the Regulators. Managing 
Intellectual Property, 82, 16-31 
 
25) CZABAN, J and LESKOVSEK, N., 2003. Beyond the Patent Term: 
Regulatory Exclusivities In The U.S. Pharmaceutical Market - 
Crucial Issues and Strategies. Available at: 
  http://www.hewm.com/use/articles/BeyondthePatentTerm.pdf 
 
26) Doctor’s Guide, (1996). Thalidomide Submitted for NDAs for Use In 
Leprosy and AIDS Cachexia. Available from:  
  http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/daa6.htm 
 58
27) DRAHOS, P., 2000. Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property 
and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-collecting Society the answer? 
European Intellectual Property Review, 22(6), 245-250 
 
28) DRAHOS, P., et al. The FTA and the PBS: A submission to the 
Senate Select Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
Available at: http://evatt.labor.net.au/publications/papers/126.html 
 
29) EU v. Canada. WTO Decision WT/DS114/R 
 
30) Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Medical 
Inventions in the UK Patent Office (March 2004). Available at: 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/reference/mediguidlines/second.htm 
 




32) Generics BV v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd [1997] 
R.P.C. 801 ECJ 
 
33) GLASGOW, L., 2001. Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property 
Rights:  Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far? IDEA, 227, 
235-36 
 
34) GOLLIN, M., 1999. New rules for natural products research: 
Dwindling natural resources have spurred tighter regulations for 
biodiversity prospecting. Nature Biotechnology, 17, 921-922. 
 





36) JONES, N., and NITTENBERG, R., 1999. “Essentially Similar” 
despite being Different – the Squibb Case. European Intellectual 
Property Review. 21(4), 217-219 
 
37) JONES, N., and NITTENBERG, R., 1999. “European Community: 
Pharmaceuticals – Marketing Authorisation. European Intellectual 
Property Review. 21(3), N50-51 
 
38) JOSEFSON, D., 2002 US Senate considers proposal to tighten drug 
patent law, British Medical Journal, 324, 1176. 
 
39) KAMAL-SMITH, M., et al., 2002. Generic competition, price and 
access to medicines. Oxfam Briefing Papers, July 2002. 
 
40) KAMATH, G (2003). Drug Patents: The Linkage Issue. 
BusinessWorld India. Available at:  
http://www.businessworldindia.com/Dec1503/news06.asp 
 
41) Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II. (Bundesgerichthof Case X ZR 
68/94) 
 
42) LEXCHIN, J., (2004) Brief to the Industry, Science and Technology 
Committee on Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food 
and Drugs Act. Available at:  
  http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/patent-amend/submissions 
  %200304/Bill%20C-9_Lexchin%20BRief_Feb%202004.PDF 
 
43) LINGHAM, A. (2000) Thalidomide. Available at: 
http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/thalidomide/start.html 
 




45) Navigant Consulting (2004). Generic Pharmaceutical Litigation. 
Available from: http://www.navigantconsulting.com/lifesciences 
/SMR/genlit/genlitSP.pdf 
 
46) OLLILA, E, HEMMINKI, E. 1996. Secrecy in drug regulation. Int. J. 
Risk Safety Med., 9, 161-72. 
 
47) Ono Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. V. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 
1998. Case No. Heisei 10 (Ju) 153. 
 
48) PALMEDO, M. and MAYNE, R., (2002). US Bullying on Drug 
Patents: One Year After Doha. Oxfam Briefing Papers, November 
2002. 
 
49) Prendergast’s Applications [2000] RPC 446 
 
50) PUGATSCH, M.P., 2004. Intellectual property and pharmaceutical 
data exclusivity in the context of innovation and market access. 
ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy options for 




51) R. v Medicines Control Agency ex. p. Generics (UK) Ltd [1997] 2 
C.M.L.R. 201 
 
52) R. v Medicines Control Agency ex. p. Generics (UK) Ltd [1998] 
E.C.R. I-7967 
 
53) R. v. The Licensing Authority ex. p. Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK 
Limited [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 26 
 
54) R. v Licensing Authority Ex p. Smith Kline & French Laboratories 
Ltd (No.1) [1990] 1 A.C. 64 
 61
55) Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Investors Meeting, 9 September 2004, 
Mumbai. www.ranbaxy.com/inv_2004/investors_meet_2004.ppt 
 
56) ROBINS, A., 2002. Making Europe's pharma industry competitive. 
Managing Intellectual Property, 124, 5 
 
57) Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. 
Cir. 04/23/1984) 
 
58) ROSENTHAL, J., 2002. Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive 
Settlements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 
Berkeley Tech. Law Journal, 17 (317), 328-29. 
 
59) SCHACHT, W. and THOMAS, J., 2002. Pharmaceutical Patent Term 
Extensions: A Brief Explanation. CRS Report for Congress, Penny 
Hill Press. 
 
60) SCHACHT, W.H. and THOMAS, J.R. (2003) The Hatch-Waxman 
Act: Proposed Legislative Changes Affecting Pharmaceutical Patents 
[online]. Congressional Research Service. Available from 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/IB10105.pdf 
 
61) The Wellcome Trust (2003). Clinical Trials. Available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/genome/tacklingdisease/hg12b006.html 
 
62) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Annex 1C of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements completed in 1994. Full official text 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf 
 
63) WIRZ, M., 2003. Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years? Oklahoma 
Journal of Law & Technology, Unknown. 
 
 
 62
